



**EINLADUNG ZUM VORTRAG**

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**UNIVERSITÄT GRONINGEN (NIEDERLANDE)**

**SELF-FULFILLING EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE**  
**AND RECOGNITION THEORY**

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## SELF-FULFILLING EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AND RECOGNITION THEORY

The concept of testimonial injustice, due to Miranda Fricker, captures cases where structural prejudices about a person's social identity lead people to assign lower credibility to her utterances. On Fricker's account, these prejudices have to be false. This paper considers testimonial injustice arising out of true prejudices: Self-fulfilling identity prejudices that stem from identity threats (or stereotype threats). An example is the presence of sexist male behaviour negatively influencing mathematical performance in women. For a particular group to suffer self-fulfilling testimonial injustice there has to be a negative structural identity prejudice against the group which, in the presence of corresponding identity threats, members of the group adopt in ways that bypass autonomous belief formation, and to which they respond non-autonomously in ways making the prejudice self-fulfillingly true. I argue that self-fulfilling testimonial injustice leads to the wrongs that it will decrease epistemic self-trust and epistemic self-esteem, three concepts I briefly develop in this paper, thereby connecting work on epistemic injustice with work on recognition theory by Axel Honneth and others. Finally, I show that the concept of self-fulfilling testimonial injustice helps diagnosing cases of potential injustice the view of which is obscured by the received approach to discrimination in law and economics that is insensitive to self-fulfilling identity prejudices.

**BOUDEWIJN DE BRUIN** ist Professor an den Fakultäten für Philosophie und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität Groningen (Niederlande). Er studierte Mathematik und Philosophie in Amsterdam und Berkeley und promovierte an der Universität von Amsterdam. Er hatte Gastpositionen in Cambridge, Paris (MSH) und Harvard inne und ist lebenslanges Mitglied von Clare Hall, Cambridge. De Bruins Forschungsinteressen liegen in der Moralphilosophie und politischen Philosophie, Wissenstheorie, Philosophie der Ökonomie und Finanzethik. Er ist Autor von: *Explaining Games. The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory*. Dordrecht u. a.: Springer 2010; *Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis. Why Incompetence is Worse than Greed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015. Mit Alex Oliver (Cambridge) leitet er ein Programm über Vertrauen und Finanzen und mit Miranda Fricker (CUNY/Sheffield) ein Programm über epistemische Gerechtigkeit, die beide vom Niederländischen Research Council (NWO) finanziert werden.